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WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
course of a manslaughter prosecution that he had obtained a
voluntary statement from the accused in jail. Counsel for the
accused sought to show that the statement when obtained had
not been written down but was later typed out from memory,
and on cross-examination asked the deputy whether he had had
pencil and paper or a typewriter with him in the jail cell. The
trial judge ruled that the witness could not be asked this ques-
tion, since on his direct examination he had not testified that the
statement was taken down in writing. This was error, the su-
preme court said, citing Article 376. When the deputy testified
that he had obtained the statement, accused had the right to
cross-examine him as to all the circumstances under which the
statement was made. He was to be subjected to questions on the
whole case, which included the particular fact to which the wit-
ness had testified in chief.
In the Jugger case, in which several confessions were offered
in evidence, the state rested its case; and accused asked to be
allowed to take the stand for the sole purpose of showing that
the confessions were obtained under duress. The court held that
not allowing him to do so was correct. Article 462 requires
accused as a witness to be subjected to complete cross-exam-
ination.65
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Dale E. Bennett*
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The right of one charged with a federal felony to have the
assistance of counsel to aid in his defense is provided for in the
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The consti-
tutions of the various states, including that of Louisiana,' contain
similar provisions. The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
further provides that it shall be the duty of the court to assign
counsel in cases when a defendant charged with a felony makes
an affidavit that he is unable to procure such legal assistance.2
While it is well settled that failure to appoint counsel upon
request constitutes reversible error, the court need not appoint
counsel for the defendant unless he requests it. A related ques-
tion, which has given courts in Louisiana and other states con-
65. Id. at 55.
1. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 9. Similar provisions are found in earlier
Louisiana constitutions beginning with Art. VI, § 18, of the Constitution
of 1812.
2. Art. 143, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
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siderable difficulty, is-Does the right to counsel include a duty
of the trial court to advise the accused of the existence and nature
of such right?3 The practice of the federal district courts is now
established by Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure,4 which directs the trial judge to advise the accused of
his right to counsel, thus codifying the jurisprudence as recently
established by the leading case of Johnson v. Zerbst.5 While the
various state constitutional provisions do not expressly provide
for advice to the accused of his right to counsel, statutory pro-
visions in thirteen states implement their constitutional guaran-
tee by requiring the court to inform the accused of this right at
the time of his arraignment.6 Such, notice is unnecessary, how-
ever, where the accused has actual knowledge, or imputed knowl-
edge from prior criminal prosecutions or other special circum-
stances, of his right to counsel.
In Louisiana, while there is no specific statutory duty upon
the court to inform an accused of his right to counsel, it has been
the general practice of the trial courts to inform the accused of
this right in cases where he was apparently without such knowl-
edge. That this practice was considered as a necessary ancillary
of the constitutional and statutory right to counsel was clearly
enunciated in State v. Youchunas.7 In that case the court held
that it was the duty of the trial judge, where the defendant was
arraigned without counsel, to ascertain why he was without
counsel and if he desired to have counsel appointed. While the
right to counsel may be waived it must be intelligently relin-
quished. In the Youchunas case the supreme court held that it
was a "serious irregularity" if the minutes of the court failed to
state that the accused had been expressly informed of his right
to counsel, or failed to include circumstances from which his
knowledge might readily be imputed.8
The recent case of State v. Hilaire9 places a distinct limitation
upon, and partially overrules, the supreme court's previous deci-
sion in the Youchunas case. Hilaire had pleaded guilty upon six
3. For a complete collection of cases, see Annotation, 3 A.L.R. 2d 1003
(1949).
4. 18 U.S.C.A. following Section 687 (1950).
5. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). This rule had also been applicable to the case where
the defendant desired to plead guilty without going to trial, Walker v. John-
son, 312 U.S. 275 (1941).
6. 3 A.L.R. 2d 1006, Note 2 (1949).
7. 187 La. 281, 174 So. 356 (1937).
8. 187 La. 281, 284, 174 So. 356, 358. Accord: State v. Blankenship, 186 La.
238, 172 So. 4 (1937).
9. 216 La. 972, 45 So. 2d 360 (1950).
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charges of simple burglary and had been sentenced accordingly.
On the next day he filed a motion for an appeal, relying on the
Youchunas case, and contending that the trial judge had com-
mitted reversible error in that the minutes of the court failed to
show that counsel had been appointed for him at the time of his
arraignment and plea of guilty. In overruling this contention,
the court distinguished the Youchunas decision by pointing out
that in that case the defendant had gone to trial protesting his
innocence and had not pleaded guilty as in the instant case. To
the extent that the Youchunas decision purported to hold that the
minutes of the court must always show either that the defendant
had counsel or that his right to counsel had been intelligently
waived, it was distinctly limited by the Hilaire case to those situ-
ations where the defendant actually went to trial protesting his
innocence.
A very practical reason for the distinction made by the
supreme court is evidenced by Justice Fournet's declaration that
"For us to hold otherwise at this time, after the several courts of
this State have been accepting pleas of guilty on arraignment
without assigning counsel to the accused under the practice and
procedure long prevailing, would only serve as an avenue for the
release of a majority of the inmates of the Louisiana State Peni-
tentiary who are now serving under pleas of guilty." 10 Any
other holding, it is submitted, would have resulted in an ava-
lanche of petitions by those presently serving sentences under
guilty pleas-claims based upon no substantial plea of inno-
cence, but only upon the technical ground that the record failed
to show that the accused had been specifically informed of his
right to counsel at the time he entered his plea. Sometimes crim-
inal appeals appear to assume the form of a game of checkers-
if so, the Hilaire decision may well have blocked defense counsel
out of an easy path to the king's row.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CAPITAL CASES
Counsel appointed for a defendant in a capital case must
have had "at least five years' actual experience at the bar."" One
of the most earnestly urged of the fifty-one defense bills of excep-
tions in the Dowdy12 case was the fact that only one of the four
assigned defense attorneys possessed the requisite five years'
experience, and that that member had been absent during three
10. 216 La. 972, 978, 45 So. 2d 360, 362.
11. Art. 143, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
12. 47 So. 2d 497 (La. 1950).
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night sessions of the trial. These night sessions had been held
for the convenience of the jury, with full agreement of defense
counsel, who knew that the senior attorney would be physically
unable to attend. In holding adversely to defendant's conten-
tion, the supreme court stressed the fact that counsel with the
requisite experience had been appointed, thus fully complying
with the statutory requirement. 13 After counsel is appointed and
accepted, the law makes no distinction, according to the supreme
court, between employed and assigned counsel. At any event,
after the defense had agreed to waive the presence of the senior
counsel at certain stages of the trial, they could hardly be heard
to urge the counsel's absence as a ground for reversal. Herein,
it is submitted, was the inherent weakness of the defense coun-
sel's bill of exceptions.
INTERRUPTION OF PRESCRIPTION
After an indictment is found it becomes the duty of the dis-
trict attorney to prosecute the case promptly and to nolle prose-
qui a felony charge which has not been brought to trial within
the three-year period established by paragraph three of the gen-
eral prescription article.14 This three-year prescription period is
inapplicable where the accused "has escaped trial through dila-
tory pleas." In State v. Bradford,5 where more than three years
had elapsed since the accused was indicted for forgery, the state
sought to toll the running of the prescriptive period by the defen-
dant's motion for a bill of particulars. This motion had been held
under advisement by the district court during the entire three-
year period. The principal question in the case was whether the
motion for particulars was a "dilatory plea" which interrupted
the running of the prescriptive period. Acting upon the theory
that the bill of particulars is a necessary adjunct to the use of
the short form indictment and that the unusual delay in bring-
ing the case to trial was through no fault of the defendant, the
supreme court had first sustained the plea of prescription and
ordered that the charge be dismissed. On rehearing, the supreme
court reversed its original decision. Justice LeBlanc reasoned
that the bill of particulars, since it tended to retard the progress
of the criminal action and was not a defense to the merits, was a
"dilatory plea" within the intent of the prescription article. How-
ever, the case was remanded to the district court for the purpose
13. See note 11, supra.
14. Art. 8, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
15. 217 La. 32, 45 So. 2d 897 (1950).
[VOL. XI
WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
of determining the cause of the delay and ascertaining the fault,
if any. Actually, this holding is not very different in practical
result from the first decision, for it may be assumed that, unless
the trial court attributes the fault to the defendant, the plea of
prescription will still be sustained and the charge ordered dis-
missed. It appears that the supreme court is in general agree-
ment as to the general proposition that the three-year period is
interrupted only by trial delays which the state is powerless to
avoid, but is divided as to whether or not the state was per se at
fault in not bringing the instant case to trial.
VENUE-RECEIVING STOLEN THINGS
In State v. Ellerbel6 the defendant had knowingly received
five stolen hogs in Franklin Parish and had taken them to his
home in Caldwell Parish, where they remained in his possession
until located by the officers of the law. There was no question
but that Franklin Parish, where the stolen hogs were received,
would have been a proper parish for trying the defendant as a
receiver of stolen things.17 In such a prosecution it would have
been immaterial where the theft was committed. 8 On the theory
thaf "receiving stolen things is a continuing offense, particularly
with respect to that phase thereof involving the concealing of the
property involved," the trial judge had held that the offense was
cognizable in Caldwell Parish. In setting aside the conviction and
sentence, the supreme court declared that there was no showing
of a concealment of the pigs in Caldwell Parish. The trial judge
and the supreme court appeared to be in agreement upon the
basic legal principles involved. Where stolen property is received
in one parish and thereafter concealed in another parish, the
offense is a continuing offense and prosecution may be had in
either parish. Where, however, the property is merely held in
the second parish, but not concealed, no offense is being com-
mitted in that parish and a prosecution there is not authorized.
In stating this distinction, Justice McCaleb stressed the fact that
Article 69 of the Criminal Code defines Receiving Stolen Things
as the "procuring, receiving or concealing" of stolen property.
Thus it is more limited than the prior statute,1 9 which had de-
nounced the "receiving or having" of stolen property, and where-
in mere possession of the property would have sufficed to effect
a continuation of the crime into the second parish.
16. 47 So. 2d 30 (La. 1950).
17. Art. 69, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
18. State v. Blotner, 197 La. 192, 1 So. 2d 74 (1941).
19. La. Act 369 of 1938.
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INDICTMENTS-LONG AND SHORT FORMS
Where the long form indictment is used to charge a crime
embracing a number of separate but related types of criminal
activities, the state must specify which phase of the crime is
charged. For example, Article 103 of the Criminal Code, embrac-
ing the subject matter of several former separate statutes, enu-
merates a number of different ways in which a person may be
guilty of Disturbing the Peace, with each way set out in a sep-
arate clause. In State v. Morgan20 it was held insufficient to
broadly charge that the defendants "did unlawfully disturb the
peace," without specifying the type of disturbance committed.
This rule was applied, in State v. Varnado,2 1 to an information
for Gambling,2 2 a crime defined in general terms rather than by an
enumeration of the numerous ways in which the offense might
be committed.
In State v. Prejean23 the defendant challenged the sufficiency
of a bill of information which charged the crime of Indecent
Behavior with a Juvenile.24 It was argued that this information,
which followed the language of the statute and described that
act as a "lewd and lascivious" one was not sufficient to inform
the accused of the nature of the crime with which he was charged.
Following an imposing list of decisions from other jurisdictions
dealing with the charging of sex crimes, the court pointed out
that the defendant had been sufficiently apprised of the charge
made against him when the information was phrased in the lan-
guage of the statute denouncing the crime, stating that it was
unnecessary to set forth the facts showing the specific form and
manner of the lewd and lascivious act in question. The court
pointed out that in such important offenses as murder 25 and man-
slaughter,26 which may take a variety of forms, it is not neces-
sary to set forth the particular acts constituting the offense. The
20. 204 La. 499, 15 So. 2d 866 (1943), discussed 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 189
(1945).
21. 208 La. 319, 23 So. 2d 106 (1945).
22. Art. 90, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
23. 216 La. 1072, 45 So. 2d 627 (1950).
24. Art. 81, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
25. Use of the short form indictment for murder was upheld in State v.
Layton, 217 La. 57, 46 So. 2d 37 (1950), and in State v. Leming, 217 La. 257, 46
So. 2d 262 (1950).
26. State v. Nichols, 216 La. 622, 627, 44 So. 2d 318, 319 (1950), upheld a
short form charge of manslaughter, with the supreme court reaffirming its
frequently stated holding that "the provision to the effect that the district
attorney may be required to furnish a bill of particulars setting forth more
specifically the nature of the offense charged amply protects the defendant's
constitutional guarantee that he shall be fully informed of the nature and
character of the accusation."
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supreme court distinguished its earlier holding in State v. He-
bert.2 7 In that case the bills of information had been found
fatally defective because the offense of Indecent Behavior with
Juveniles was one which embraced two specific methods of com-
mission, that is, by a lewd or lascivious act either on the person of
or in the presence of the juvenile, but the informations had failed
to state whether the act was committed on the person or in the
presence of the victim. In the Prejean case, however, the infor-
mation had specified that the offense was committed upon the
person of the juvenile, and the defendant's objection was levelled
solely at the fact that the specific details of the act had not been
spelled out in the information.
In charging these crimes which are a composite of related
types of criminal conduct, the short form indictment provisions
of Article 23528 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are now avail-
able. Thus it would have been entirely appropriate in the Prejean
case to simply charge that the defendant "did commit the crime of
Indecent Behavior with Juveniles as defined by Article 81 of the
Criminal Code." If the defendant needed further information as
to which form of offense was intended, that information could be
secured through a bill of particulars. While the long form indict-
ment was adequate in the Prejean case, the use of the short form
indictment would eliminate the possibility of an inadvertent in-
sufficiency such as the one which had rendered the informations
invalid in the Hebert case. The sufficiency of the short form
indictment, as extended to these comprehensive crimes by the
1944 amendment, is evidenced by the court's upholding its appli-
cation, in State v. Davis,29 to the all-embracing offense of gam-
bling, which may assume a wide variety of multifarious forms.
Adoption of the short form, however, has not automatically
solved all problems as to the charging of those crimes which may
be committed in a number of ways. It is generally the function
of the bill of particulars to describe how the offense was com-
mitted, but in the case of multiple offenses it is not always feas-
ible to state which form of the offense is charged. The overlap-
ping facts may bring the offense under one or the other of two
clauses in the article defining the crime, with the result that the
prosecution may be unable to ascertain in advance just which
27. 205 La. 110, 17 So. 2d 3 (1944), discussed in 6 LOUISINA LAW RmEvw 190
(1945).
28. La. Act 223 of 1944, discussed by author, 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 16-18
(1946).
29. 208 La. 954, 23 So. 2d 801 (1945), noted in 6 LOUiSIAUNA LAW Rvmxw 715
(1946).
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phase of the crime will be established after all the evidence has
been presented to the jury. Such a situation arose in State v.
Prince,8 0 where the defendant was charged with attempted aggra-
vated rape. The state's proof, as shown by the per curiam of the
trial judge, was to the effect that the victim had resisted to the
utmost and also that resistance had been prevented by threats
of the defendant who drew a knife on her. Apparently the proof
was such that a jury might well have found either resistance to
the utmost, compliance as a result of threats, or a combination
of the two. Under these circumstances, the bill of particulars
stated that the prosecution was being brought under Subsections
(1) and (2) of Article 42 of the Criminal Code. The supreme
court appropriately held that there was no merit to defense
counsel's contention that the state must choose in advance be-
tween the two ways in which the crime of aggravated rape might
have been committed. If additional authority were necessary to
substantiate the decision, Article 222 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure states that where several distinct offenses are disjunc-
tively enumerated in a statute, the alternative offenses may be
cumulated in a single count and charged conjunctively. Where
such a dual charge is brought, proof of either phase of the charge
will sustain a conviction.31 Thus, in a situation like the Prince
case, it is entirely appropriate either to charge the crime in a dual
form or to use the short form and specify dual charges in the
bill of particulars.
Where the long form indictment is employed, every element
of the crime charged must be spelled out.3 2 In the recent case of
State v. Gros88 a long form bill of information was found insuffi-
cient to sustain a conviction of Resisting an Officer,8 4 because it
had failed to allege that the defendant knew or had reason to
know that the deputy sheriff resisted was acting in his official
capacity. Since such knowledge was an essential element of the
offense, the omission from the charge rendered the information
invalid. Under the short form indictment, the offense could have
been charged by using merely the name and article number of
the crime.8 5
30. 216 La. 989, 45 So. 2d 366 (1950).
31. State v. Bryan, 175 La. 442, 143 So. 362 (1932).
32. Art. 227, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, requires that the indictment
must state "every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the offense."
33. 216 La. 103, 43 So. 2d 232 (1949).
34. Art. 108, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
35. State v. Davis, 208 La. 954, 23 So. 2d 801 (1945), noted in 6 LOUISIANA
LAW REviW 715 (1946).
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The dismissal of the state's appeal in State v. Newman3 6
turned entirely upon a question of the supreme court's appellate
jurisdiction. The trial judge had quashed a short form bill of
information charging the -Illegal Carrying of Weapons, as de-
nounced by Paragraph 1 of Article 95 of the Louisiana Criminal
Code, on the ground "that it did not charge a crime known to
the laws of this state." However, the state had no right to an
appellate review, since the supreme court's jurisdiction is limited
to felonies or misdemeanors "where a fine exceeding $300.00 or
imprisonment exceeding six months has actually been imposed. '37
Since the prosecution had been dismissed prior to trial and no
sentence had been imposed there was no basis for appellate
review.
JURY-EXCLUSION OF NEGROES
The United States Supreme Court held, in Pierre v. State of
Louisiana,38 that a systematic exclusion of Negroes from the jury
venire and jury lists constitutes a denial of due process and equal
protection of the law. Since then the Louisiana Supreme Court
has, in a series of carefully reasoned decisions,3 9 drawn a rather
clear pattern as to the necessary procedures for compliance with
the United States Supreme Court's mandate. In strict conformity
with these rulings it has been the general practice of trial judges,
in cases where it is evident that Negro defendants are to be tried
for felonies in the coming court term, to instruct jury commis-
sions to be very careful to afford the Negro race reasonable repre-
sentation upon general jury venire lists and upon the petit jury
and grand jury lists. Nevertheless, cases still occasionally arise
where claims of "systematic exclusion" are alleged and main-
tained. Such a situation was presented in State v. Nichols. 40
Counsel for a Negro defendant who had been tried, convicted,
and sentenced for the crime of manslaughter had duly objected
to the indictment and the trial jury. Only two or three names of
Negroes had been included in the three hundred names compris-
ing the general venire. The grand jury list of twenty names had
included no Negroes, and no Negro had served on a grand jury in
36. 216 La. 236, 43 So. 2d 593 (1949).
37. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10; Art. 95, La. Code of Crim. Proc.
of 1928.
38. 306 U.S. 354 (1939). See Note, 1 LOUISIANA LAW RE IEw 841 (1939), re
subsequent hearing. For a complete discussion of this problem, see Com-
ment, 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 548 (1948.)
39. See symposium discussion of supreme court decisions, 6 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 660 (1946), and 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 296 (1948).
40. 216 La. 622, 44 So. 2d 318 (1950).
1951]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the parish in the last forty years. Also, the petit jury list for the
week during which the defendant was tried had included only
one Negro name, and this Negro was unacceptable because of his
relation to the deceased by marriage. That this situation was not
inadvertent was shown by the testimony of the clerk of court
who was ex-officio a member of the jury commission. He testified
to his personal opinion that Negroes should not serve on juries,
further stating that he had been in public life for some fifteen
years and had never known of a Negro to serve on either a grand
or petit jury. The jury commissioners testified along similar
lines. There was evidence of a general exclusion of Negroes from
jury service over the past forty years. In setting aside the con-
viction, the supreme court held that the facts of the instant case
were on all fours with the celebrated case of Pierre v. State of
Louisiana and that a showing of discriminatory exclusion of Ne-
groes from jury service had been made. Without specifically
finding that the facts disclosed a deliberate exclusion, or that the
jury selected failed to afford the accused a fair trial, the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court applied the ruling of the Pierre case that the
absence of reasonable representation of his race on the general
venire and jury lists made out a prima facie case of racial dis-
crimination and constituted a denial of due process to the Negro
defendant.
A discussion of racial discrimination in jury selection would
not be complete without a brief mention of the recent United
States Supreme Court decision of Cassell v. State of Texas.41 The
facts of the case are relatively unimportant for they established
a rather clear case of discrimination in selection of the grand
jury which indicted the Negro defendant. One of the most sig-
nificant statements of the case is Mr. Justice Reed's statement
that "Jurymen should be selected as individuals, on the basis of
individual qualifications, and not as members of a race," and that
"An accused is entitled to have charges against him considered
by a jury in the selection of which there has been neither inclu-
sion nor exclusion because of race. '42 Justice Frankfurter simi-
larly declared in a concurring opinion, "It is not a question of
presence on a grand jury nor absence from it. The basis of selec-
tion cannot conscientiously take color into account. ' 48 The net
result of this holding appears to be that no conscious mathemat-
ical formula of Negro representation is 'acceptable to the United
41. 70 S. Ct. 629 (U.S. 1950).
42. Id. at 631, 632.
43. Id. at 636.
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States Supreme Court, and the method adopted in selecting jury
venires must disregard the color line, in the same way that it
disregards racial lines among members of the white race. Theo-
retically, the rule announced is fine. Practically, it presents diffi-
culties of construction and application.
Another point emphasized by Justice Reed in the Cassell
decision was that racial discrimination "does not depend upon
systematic exclusion continuing over a long period and practiced
by a succession of jury commissioners." Rather, it is sufficient to
show, as was done in the instant case, by the testimony of the
jury commissioners themselves, that there had been a conscious
exclusion of Negro names in the formulation of the jury lists."4
GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS
Article 213 of the Code of Criminal Procedure stipulates that
"the grand jury can receive no other than legal evidence," which
is expressly limited to duly sworn witnesses and proper docu-
mentary evidence. It is generally conceded that this requirement
is to be liberally construed, to the end that an indictment will
be quashed only if it is founded entirely upon illegal evidence.
While there are very few Louisiana Supreme Court decisions in
point, an attitude of liberality is clearly borne out by the court's
handling of State v. Simpson,45 where the defendant sought to
challenge the nature and legality of the evidence upon which the
grand jury had returned a murder indictment. Initially defense
counsel filed a bill of particulars seeking full information as to
the evidence, both written and verbal, that went before the grand
jury, including a specific question as to whether the controversial
confessions of the defendant and his co-defendant were placed
before the grand jury. These so-called particulars were refused
by the trial judge. In affirming this ruling Justice Frug6 pointed
out that the function of the bill of particulars was to secure
greater detail as to the nature of the crime charged, and aptly
remarked, "That it may be used as a device for ascertaining the
nature of the evidence produced at the hearing of the grand jury
is certainly a novel proposition and one unsupported by author-
ity."46
In overruling defense counsel's motion to quash the indict-
ment, the trial judge had refused to hold a hearing on the nature
and legality of the evidence which went before the grand jury.
44. Id. at 632.
45. 216 La. 212, 43 So. 2d 585 (1949).
46. 216 La. 212, 222, 43 So. 2d 585, 587.
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In affirming the trial judge's ruling the supreme court took the
view that Article 213 was directory in nature, and could not be
used as the basis of a technical review of the evidence which was
produced before the grand jury. After all, the grand jury pro-
ceedings are merely a means of ascertaining if there is a suffi-
cient prima facie case to justify charging a crime. It is quite
different from the actual trial of the case, where all the rules of
evidence and procedure abound in resplendent technicality for
the protection of the accused.
In State v. Futch47 defense counsel's motion for a new trial
alleged the newly-discovered fact that one of the jurors was
unable to read and write. This objection came too late, for the
disqualification of a juror for illiteracy 48 must be urged before the
juror is sworn in.49 It is only where the juror has answered
falsely on voir dire examination as to the particular qualifica-
tion that the matter can be subsequently urged as a ground for
setting aside the verdict.50 Defense counsel had not examined the
juror as to his literacy, relying upon the deputy clerk of court's
usual procedure of testing all prospective jurors as to their quali-
fications when he swore them in for the voir dire examination.
Such a test, according to the supreme court, "is not intended to,
and does not, relieve the attorney trying the case of his duty to
ascertain by a voir dire examination the qualifications of those
tendered for jury service." 51 The failure of counsel to interro-
gate each juror concerning his qualifications constitutes a waiver
of such disqualifications as proper questioning would have re-
vealed.
IMPROPER REMARKS
Some improper remarks by the district attorney, such as
commenting on the failure of the defendant to take the stand
and appeals to racial prejudice, are so prejudicial that they are
incurable and are reversible per se.52 In other instances the
harmful effect of irregular utterances may be cured by the trial
judge promptly and clearly instructing the jury to disregard
them. Remarks of this second type were the basis of the supreme
court's reversal of a murder conviction in State v. Smith.53 be-
47. 216 La. 857, 44 So. 2d 892 (1950).
48. Art. 172, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
49. Id. at Art. 355.
50. State v. Oliver, 193 La. 1084, 192 So. 725 (1939).
51. 216 La. 857, 867, 44 So. 2d 892, 896. Accord: State v. Bryan, 175 La.
422, 143 So. 362 (1932).
52. See Comment, 10 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 486 (1950).
53. 216 La. 1041, 45 So. 2d 617 (1950).
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fense counsel had objected to the district attorney's statement
that the defendant is not entitled to extenuating circumstances.
This statement was improper and prejudicial, since it is the sole
function of the jury to decide if there are extenuating circum-
stances and to decide if they are of sufficient weight to render a
qualified verdict. Objection had also been taken to the intem-
perate manner in which the prosecution questioned prospective
jurors concerning their views on capital punishment. Having
become exasperated by the large number of veniremen who had
disqualified themselves because of conscientious scruples against
capital punishment, the district attorney asked whether they
would refuse to inflict capital punishment "even in the case of
rape," and "even if he raped your own daughter." The vigorous
phraseology of the questions might have been appropriate if the
homicide had been committed as an incident of attempted rape,
However, the evidence at the trial indicated that the female vic-
tim of the homicide may have been more pursuer than pursued.
There was no evidence of any but voluntary improper sexual
relations between the defendant and his victim, a married wom-
an. Under these circumstances, the questions indicating a rape-
murder charge might improperly prejudice the jury. The supreme
court found reversible error in the trial judge's failure to restrain
and instruct the jury to disregard the state's improper statements
and questions. While the jurors to whom the improper questions
were directed had been challenged for cause and did not ulti-
mately serve on the jury, the intemperate utterances were made
in the presence of other jurors who had already been selected.
It was the prejudicial effect upon these jurors, who tried the
defendant, that rendered the statements grounds for reversal.
PRESENT INSANITY-LUNACY COMMISSION
The question of present insanity may be raised at any time-
either before or during the trial. This plea does not go to the
question of guilt or innocence, but raises the issue of whether the
defendant "is unable to understand the proceedings against him
or to assist in his defense. ' 54 This is a very definite and practical
test, and is not to be treated as co-extensive with the other
myriad forms which mental disorders may assume. In State v.
Layton5 5 the court held that evidence indicating that at the time
of the trial defendant "was afflicted with psychoneurosis (a nerv-
54. Art. 267, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928. For an excellent discussion
of the proper test of the defendant's present triability, see United States v.
Chisholm, 149 Fed. 284 (S.D. Ala. 1906).
55. 217 La. 57, 46 So. 2d 37 (1950).
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ous disorder attended with fears and anxiety)" did not prevent
his being able "to understand the proceedings against him and
to assist in his own defense."
The issue of present insanity is determined by the trial judge,
usually in a preliminary hearing. Since this hearing forms no
part of the actual trial and does not relate to the guilt or inno-
cence of the accused, State v. Basio,56 held that it was not neces-
sary for the defendant to be present at the time of the court's
determination of his present sanity, nor at the time when the
court decreed him to be presently sane and ordered the trial to
proceed.
DEFENSE OF INSANITY
Since the adoption of the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure,
insanity has been treated as a separate plea to the merits. 57 Thus
it was held in State v. Gunter"8 that evidence of insanity at the
time of the crime was inadmissible under a general plea of not
guilty. However, the converse is not true and where insanity is
specially pleaded, that issue along with all other issues relating
to guilt or innocence (such as self-defense and whether the
defendant committed the criminal act) are triable at the same
time. Language of Article 267 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure, requiring that the issue of insanity be tried before
the general plea of not guilty, was deleted in 1932. 59 As a result
the courts now hold that the pleas of "insanity" and "not guilty,"
though separate pleas, are triable at the same time and by the
same jury. This procedure was affirmed in State v. Dowdy 0
where the supreme court upheld the refusal of the trial judge to
grant the defendant a separate trial on the plea of insanity at
the time of the crime.
Actually, it is unfortunate that the original separation of
these pleas has not been maintained. Evidence tending toward,
but not establishing insanity frequently clouds the jury's percep-
tion of the basic question of whether the defendant did or did not
commit the crime charged. The original provision for separate
trials was unworkable because most country parishes found it
practically impossible to furnish two juries for capital cases. The
use of a single jury would prejudice the defendant by requiring
him first to argue insanity, that is, that he committed the crime
56. 216 La. 365, 43 So. 2d 761 (1949).
57. Art. 261, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
58. 208 La. 694, 23 So. 2d 305 (1945).
59. La. Act 136 of 1932.
60. 47 So. 2d 497 (La. 1950).
WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
but was crazy; and then to argue before the same jury that he
did not commit the crime. The true solution to this difficult
problem appears to have been achieved in the California pro-
cedure, which reverses the order of trial of these issues. In Cali-
fornia they use one jury which first decides if the defendant did
commit the crime. Then, if the defendant is found to have com-
mitted the crime the jury passes upon the separate defense of
insanity. This procedure is certainly less confusing than our
Louisiana procedure as followed in the Dowdy case. However,
as the law now stands, the Dowdy case is correctly decided. The
remedy, if it is felt that one is necessary, is a legislative and not
a judicial one.
CONSTRUCTION OF VERDICTS
The verdict should be expressed in such plain and intelligible
words that its meaning may be understood readily by the court
passing sentence thereon. Where the verdict is incorrect in form
the trial judge should refuse to receive it and should remand to
the jury with proper instructions.6 1 In State v. Broadnax 2 the
information had charged that defendant "did wilfully and unlaw-
fully possess and have under his control, a narcotic drug, to wit:
six (6) capsules of heroin, a compound derivative, mixture and
preparation, containing opium," as denounced by the Louisiana
Narcotic Drug Act. 3 The jury's written verdict had found the
accused "Guilty of Attempted Possession." Taken by itself, the
verdict would have been vulnerable to defense counsel's objec-
tion that it was "meaningless," and that there was "no such
crime known to the laws of this state." However, when the ver-
dict was construed with reference to the charge stated in the
information, it appeared reasonably certain that the jury intended
to find the defendant guilty of attempted unlawful possession of
narcotics. In upholding the verdict, Justice Hawthorne thor-
oughly reviewed the jurisprudence and authorities dealing with
the construction of verdicts. Recognizing that the jury's verdict
is a product of the lay mind, he pointed out that it is not to be
subjected to the strict and technical rules of construction which
are applied to the lawyers' pleadings, and that language convey-
ing a commonly understood meaning will suffice. Of special sig-
nificance was the court's recognition of the logical rule that "A
verdict of a jury in a criminal case must always be read in con-
61. Art. 402, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
62. 216 La. 1003, 45 So. 2d 604 (1950).
63. La. Act 14 of 1934 (2 E.S.), § 2 (La. R.S. [1950] 40:962).
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nection with the indictment, and if it be certain, upon reading
them together, what is the meaning of the verdict, it is suffi-
ciently certain. . . . 14 While the liberal spirit of Justice Haw-
thorne's opinion does not mean that patently inadequate verdicts
such as "guilty of capital punishment" 65 or "guilty with premedi-
tation"6 " will henceforth be upheld, it does indicate a new trend
of liberality in the construction of jury verdicts. The jury's ver-
dict, though inartistic and ungrammatical, should not be set aside
unless there is a real doubt as to the jury's intended decision. In
arriving at that intention, it is certainly appropriate, as was done
in the Broadnax case, to refer to the indictment as an aid in con-
struing the verdict. This is a very practical and, from the wealth
of authorities included in Justice Hawthorne's opinion, appar-
ently a well-settled rule of construction.
A 1950 statute6 7 should do much to minimize the possibility
of jury confusion and errors in the statement of verdicts. This
act requires the judge to give the jury a written list of the ver-
dicts responsive to the crime charged, with each verdict sep-
arately and fully stated. The list of verdicts will be taken into
the jury room, thus being available for the jury's use in connec-
tion with their deliberations and judgment.
RESPONSIVE VERDICTS
The responsive verdict statute of 194868 is the most significant
criminal law enactment since the Criminal Code. This statute,
by specifically enumerating the responsive verdicts, put to rest
the very troublesome problem as to the appropriate "included
offenses" when charges are brought under the rearranged crimes
of the Criminal Code. The first object of the new statute was to
formulate a definite pattern of responsive verdicts. In addition to
achieving certainty, the statute sought to avoid jury confusion by
reducing the number of responsive verdicts and eliminating
instructions upon some of the lesser included offenses.
The advantage gained by a simplification of the jury's task
under the new statute is illustrated by State v. Simpson,69 where
64. 216 La. 1003, 1015, 45 So. 2d 604, 608 (1950), citing Henderson v. Com-
monwealth, 98 Va. 794, 34 S.E. 881, 882 (1900).
65. State v. Foster, 36 La. Ann. 857 (1884).
66. State v. Heas, 10 La. Ann. 195 (1855).
67. La. Act 436 of 1950 (La. R.S. [Supp. 1950] 15:386.1).
68. La. Act 161 of 1948, amending Art. 386, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of
1928, discussed 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 41 (1948).
69. 216 La. 212, 43 So. 2d 585 (1949). Accord: State v. Leming, 217 La. 257,
46 So. 2d 262 (1950) (constitutionality of the statute not raised); State v.
Broussard, 217 La. 90, 46 So. 2d 48 (1950) (verdict of attempted simple rape
was held responsive to a charge of attempted aggravated rape).
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the charge was murder by an intentional homicide. Defense
counsel had requested that the jury be instructed that they might
return any one of nine different verdicts, including negligent
homicide, attempted murder, attempted negligent homicide, and
attempted manslaughter. All of the verdicts listed above, except
attempted negligent homicide,70 would have been responsive
prior to 1948. In conformity with the new statute, the trial judge
had instructed the jury that the possible verdicts were: "guilty
as charged; guilty without capital punishment; guilty of man-
slaughter; not guilty." Instructions upon the additional possible
verdicts requested could have served no useful purpose. The
elimination of negligent homicide as a responsive verdict to the
charge of murder was based upon the practical consideration
that it merely served as a compromise verdict in cases where, as
in the instant case, the facts clearly showed an intentional killing.
The verdicts of attempted murder and attempted manslaughter
had never served any purpose except jury confusion, for the line
between the completed crime and the attempt is clearly drawn in
homicide cases and the appropriate charge can always be brought.
Clutching at a last straw, in an effort to set aside a murder
conviction, defense counsel contended that the responsive verdict
statute was unconstitutional. Relying upon State v. Rodosta,71
it was argued that the legislature had sought to change the sub-
stantive law of crimes by a procedural statute. The Rodosta
case had announced the general principle that an original article
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because the Code was limited
by the special constitutional authorization for its enactment as
"a comprehensive code of criminal procedure," could not change
the substantive criminal law. That decision, declared Justice
Frug6, "does not prohibit an act which amends an article of the
Code of Criminal Procedure from amending an article of the
Criminal Code where the two articles are so nearly allied in
subject and content as to make this result a necessity. '72
The new responsive verdict statute might have been sus-
tained upon the ground that it deals entirely with a procedural
question as to the scope of the trial when certain crimes are
charged, and does not purport to change the definition or nature
of any substantive crimes. Approximately a month later the
issue of whether the responsive verdict statute wrought a change
70. State v. Adams, 210 La. 782, 28 So. 2d 269 (1946), reversing a verdict of
attempted negligent homicide on the ground that such an offense is a legal
impossibility.
71. 173 La. 623, 138 La. 124 (1931).
72. 216 La. 212, 234, 43 So. 2d 585, 592 (1949).
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in the substantive or procedural law was squarely presented in
State v. Williams.73 In that case the accused was charged with
manslaughter committed on June 5, 1948, and was brought to
trial on March 29, 1949. If the responsive verdict statute affected
substantive rights it would not be applicable to defendant's crime,
which had been committed before its effective date. If it was
procedural in nature, it should govern the defendant's trial in
1949. The trial judge had applied the new statute and had
charged the jury that the only appropriate verdicts were guilty
or not guilty. Defense counsel had unsuccessfully urged the
judge to include attempted manslaughter and negligent homi-
cide in his statement of the possible verdicts. Justice Frug6 again
wrote the opinion for a unanimous court. In upholding the trial
judge's charge pursuant to the new act, the supreme court
squarely held that the change effected by the responsive verdict
statute was upon the procedural rather than the substantive
law.
In a way, it may prove helpful, in future cases involving the
validity of amendments of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that
Judge Frug6 chose to posit the Simpson case decision upon the
broad ground of recognizing a proper limitation upon the supreme
court's prior holding in the Rodosta case. A complete separation
of substantive and procedural laws is frequently impractical,
even impossible. It would be quite unfortunate if amendments
of the Code of Criminal Procedure were to be subject to chal-
lenge if they partook somewhat of substantive criminal law prin-
ciples. Similarly, amendments of the Criminal Code may often
overlap related principles of procedural law. Judge Frug6's brief
handling of this question should establish a sound guiding prin-
ciple when other similar technical objections may be raised to
the constitutionality of future legislation which may necessarily
partake somewhat of both substantive and procedural law.
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